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FROM FEDERAL RULES TO INTERSYSTEMIC
GOVERNANCE IN SECURITIES REGULATION
Robert B. Ahdieh*

In my introduction to this symposium, I outlined core characteristics of a
regulatory pattern I term "intersystemic governance"--characteristics derived
from the important work collected in this volume. Successively, I note the
sense of complexity in those contributions and the emphasis on jurisdictional
overlap as a critical source of that complexity; the authors' perhaps resulting
attention to dynamics of coordinationin law and regulation; their suggestion of
a certain interdependence of regulatory actors; and their orientation to
dynamics of persuasion, rather than more hierarchical mechanisms of
regulatory control.1 Drawn together, these elements suggest the emergence of
a distinct regulatory paradigm, both derivative and determinative of growing
patterns of jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence across traditional
jurisdictional lines.
Both to explore this possibility further and to further concretize the
elements enumerated above, I want to briefly play this analysis out in the realm
of domestic and transnational securities regulation. In the latter sphere, I
would argue, patterns of intersystemic governance are increasingly apparent
and deserving of our attention. Three cases are representative: the operation of
Rule 14a-8, promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; the
interventions of then-Attorney General Eliot Spitzer in the national securities
markets; and the Securities and Exchange Commission's recent moves to
better align U.S. and international accounting standards.

* Visiting Professor & Microsoft/LAPA Fellow, Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton
University; Professor of Law & Director, Center on Federalism and Intersystemic Governance, Emory
University School of Law. Many thanks to Bill Buzbee, Judith Resnik, Robert Schapiro, and Mark Tushnet
for their helpful counsel, and to the student editors of the Emory Law Journal for their hard work in organizing
this symposium and their patience and assistance in the editorial process.
1 See Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature of
Modem Jurisdiction,57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2007).
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THE INTERSYSTEMIC GOVERNANCE OF RULE 14A-8

Promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission to encourage
heightened shareholder participation in corporate governance, Rule 14a-8
creates one of the most significant opportunities for cross-jurisdictional
engagement in U.S. securities law. First enacted in 1947, the rule requires
public corporations to include any properly submitted shareholder proposal in
their proxy materials, unless it falls within one of several enumerated
categories of excludable proposals. 2 Three such exclusions are relevant for our
purposes: (1) where a proposal is "not a proper subject for action by
shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company's
organization"; 3 (2) if a proposal would, upon implementation, "cause the
company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject'a; or
(3) if the proposal "deals
with a matter relating to the company's ordinary
5
business operations."
As to each of these exceptions, it falls to the SEC-at least as a preliminary
matter-to assess the decision of a corporation to exclude a proposal.6
Application of these exceptions, however, turns on the law of the state of
incorporation. 7 Under Rule 14a-8(i)(1), for example, one must define the
scope of shareholder and managerial authority in the relevant jurisdiction.
Similarly, under Rule 14a-8(i)(2), one must determine the corporation's legal
obligations under state (as well as federal and foreign) law. Even Rule 14a8(i)(7) demands such an inquiry, if somewhat less obviously, given the
demarcation
of "ordinary business operations" according to applicable state
8
law.
As I have suggested elsewhere, these are rarely easy questions. 9 Even
assuming an expertise in relevant state law, ambiguity in the operative terms

2 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007); see also Robert B. Ahdieh, The DialecticalRegulation of Rule 14a8: Intersystemic Governance in CorporateLaw, 2 J.BUS. & TECH. L. 165, 171 (2007).

3 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1).
4 Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(2).

5 Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
6 See Ahdieh, supra note 2, at 171. Specifically, the Division of Corporation Finance does so in
responding to no-action letter requests asserting one or more of the applicable provisions to justify exclusion
of a shareholder proposal. See id.
7 See id.

8 See id. at 171 n.47.
9 See id. at 172; see also Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and
Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J.
205 (2005).
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presents real difficulty.' 0 The complexity of the exercise in the absence of
such expertise-and recurrent exposure to the relevant state rules-seems a
recipe for paralysis or, more realistically, arbitrary rule.
In light of this predicament, I have previously highlighted the foregoing
terms of Rule 14a-8 as creating a fruitful occasion for intersystemic
governance to play itself out. 1 Relevant incidents of cross-jurisdictional
regulatory engagement can already be identified, as in federal courts'2
certification of shareholder proxy access questions to state courts.'
Delaware's recent amendment of its constitution to allow the SEC to directly3
certify questions to the Delaware Supreme Court holds even greater promise.'
By more broadly embracing a dynamic of intersystemic governance, we can
expect further improvements in substantive outcomes.
The features of intersystemic governance identified above are readily
evident in Rule 14a-8. This begins with the overlapping scope of federal
securities law and state corporate law when it comes to the proxy.' 4 The
content of the corporate proxy, including many shareholder proposals, directly
implicates governance of the modem public corporation.' 5 As such, it is
directed to state law. Access to the proxy and shareholder voting, on the other
hand, have long been regulated by federal securities law; Rule 14a-8 is but one
example. The pattern of overlap could not be more apparent: While the
content of the proxy speaks to state law, shareholder access to, and voting on,
it is largely regulated by federal law.
Given such overlap in the "substance" of law, it is unsurprising that the
SEC and relevant state actors, legislative and judicial alike, likewise play
overlapping roles in proxy regulation. Under Rule 14a-8, in fact, these roles
are so intertwined that it becomes difficult to tell a coherent story about
discrete federal versus state law and analysis.
Admittedly, a certain
preeminence emerges in actual practice; the SEC has, in operationalizing Rule

10 See Ahdieh, supra note 2, at 172.
1

See generally id.; see also McDonnell, supra note 9, at 254-58.

12 See, e.g., Int'l Board of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 173 F.3d. 863 (10th Cir. 1999); see
Ahdieh, supra note 2, at 175.
13 S.B. 62, 144th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2007); see also Maureen Milford, New State Law
Expands Delaware's Role in Corporate Governance, NEWS J. (Wilmington, Del.), May 19,2007.

14 I have already noted the complexity of the interpretative project under Rule 14a-8. See supra notes 9-

10 and accompanying text; see also Ahdieh, supra note I, at 7-11.
15 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REv. 588, 612-14 (2003).
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14a-8, placed itself in the forefront. 16 On its face, however, the rule would
seem to the contrary.
Rule 14a-8 might thus be understood as a coordination-forcingmechanism.
The SEC's need to evaluate perhaps inherently ambiguous state law makes
such coordination invaluable.
If consistency of interpretation is to be
maintained, it is necessary for state legislators and judges, on the one hand, and
the SEC staff, on the other, to align their expectations of what is possible-and
desirable-in the proxy solicitation process. 17
This dynamic can fairly be described as one of dependence." Within a
scheme of intersystemic governance under Rule 14a-8, each regulatory actor is
dependent on the other in important respects. Nominally, the SEC can assert
any interpretation it prefers when evaluating relevant state law. State courts
and legislatures, however, are likely to ignore arbitrary SEC analysis. Post hoc
corrections are costly for the states, however, such that they too might prefer
engagement. The structural incentives might therefore be expected to19 motivate
both federal and state agencies to attend more closely to one another.
The nature of this dependence warrants explicit attention. Rather than a
hierarchical interaction, in which one party is dependent on the other, the
relevant pattern under Rule 14a-8 cuts both ways; it is a kind of
interdependence. Desired outcomes cannot be secured by force alone; they
require a capacity for persuasion as well. Effective advocacy-the pattern of
externally directed persuasion described above-is all-important."
If the
SEC-or state judges, for that matter--can articulate effective arguments for
any given interpretation, it is far more likely to prevail within the available
range of analysis and decision.
Going a step further, we might see the concurrent role of federal and state
actors under Rule 14a-8 as creating the kind of locus for effective persuasion
that I described in the introduction. Within this regime of structured-even
16 See Ahdieh, supra note 2, at 172-74. This might be seen to exemplify the resistance to overlap I
described in my introductory remarks to this volume. See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 16-17.
17 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 215, 230-33 (2004).
18 See Ahdieh, supranote 2, at 180-81.
19 See id. at 181; cf. Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 863, 900, 907-08
(2006) [hereinafter Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation]; Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree:
InternationalReview of NationalCourts, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2029, 2088-91 (2004).
20 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 27-29.
21 See id. at 25-27.
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unavoidable--engagement and conflict, there emerges the opportunity for
significant evolution in relevant legal norms. The dynamic of regulatory
engagement in an intersystenic approach to Rule 14a-8, with its central role
for persuasion, might consequently be expected to look quite different.
WHEN SPITZER MET THE

SEC,

ON WALL STREET

A similar story of intersystemic governance can be found in Eliot Spitzer's
forceful charge against Wall Street during his tenure as Attorney General of
the State of New York. Together with other state officials 22-if perhaps more
forcefully and flamboyantly than them-Spitzer broke with the longstanding
allocation of federal and state regulatory authority over the capital markets.
Traditionally, major financial market actors were left to the SEC, while
smaller-scale fraud was handled by state attorneys general,
comptrollers,
23
securities market regulators, and other state-level officials.
Dispensing with this traditional allocation of jurisdiction, Spitzer directed
his fire at the heart of Wall Street, a locale he saw as fully within his formal
jurisdiction and enforcement authority-even if much of the relevant conduct
had occurred well beyond the latter. In cases targeted at investment bank
conflicts of interest, the selective provision of access to IPO shares,
impermissible executive compensation, and mutual fund trading practices, 24
Spitzer pressed broad-bore challenges to longstanding, nationwide financial
market practices. By way of legal authority, he invoked the open-ended terms
of the Martin Act25-state anti-fraud legislation that had basically lain fallow
until Spitzer's crusade. By the end, he had extracted wide-ranging concessions
from the industry, including structural reforms going well beyond the scope 26
of
his actual suits and well beyond the scope of his New York state jurisdiction.
Here, as under Rule 14a-8, the dynamic of substantive overlap suggested in
the introduction to this volume is apparent. Especially under Spitzer's
expansive reading of the Martin Act, relevant Wall Street activity came within
22 See Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 19, at 874 n.39; Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism:
Competition, Cooperationand SecuritiesEnforcement, II CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 114-15 (2004).
23 See Ahdieh, DialecticalRegulation, supra note 19, at 872; see also Michael D. Mann & William P.
Barry, Developments in the Internationalizationof SecuritiesEnforcement, 1487 PLI/CoRP 399, 406 (2005).
24 See Ahdieh, DialecticalRegulation, supra note 19, at 872-74.
25 N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352 (2006).
26 See Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 19, at 873-74; see also Cary Coglianese et al., The
Role of Government in CorporateGovernance, I N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 219, 221 n.5 (2004).
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the State of New York's civil and criminal jurisdiction, while remaining under
the regulatory umbrella of the federal securities laws. Exposure to both federal
and state law was hardly a new phenomenon for these, and other, firms.
Consider their need to comply with both state employment law and federal tax
obligations. The latter, however, involves the regulation of discrete legal
arenas. With Spitzer's broad invocation of the Martin Act to pursue alleged
fraud in the financial markets, the overlap was far more stark; now, federal and
state law were targeting precisely the same conduct.
A relevant horizontal dimension of overlap also deserves mention. Part of
the rationale for allocating jurisdiction over broad claims against Wall Street to
the SEC was the nature of the subject firms. Most, if not all, of the targets of
Spitzer's claims were national firms doing business across multiple
jurisdictions. Here, overlap arises from the nature of the regulated entity.
Recognizing as much, yet unwilling to await action by what he saw as an
overly passive SEC, Spitzer instead reached out to other state regulators
directly, seeking to coordinate their enforcement efforts with his own.27 His
final settlements thus reflected not only the vertical dimension of overlap, but a
horizontal dimension as well, with their inclusion of both the SEC and other
state authorities. 28 In Spitzer's enforcement initiatives, then, we can see the
overlapping nature of both private and public actors highlighted in the
introduction.
The regulatory pursuits of Spitzer and the SEC were likewise characterized
by a certain interdependence. Nominally, each exercised their authority freeand-clear of the other. Neither had any duty to cooperate-or even
coordinate-with the other. In practice, however, the efforts of each to pursue
the regulatory ends dictated by their mandates and shaped by their own
priorities depended heavily
on the other. Neither could ignore the other
29
without substantial cost.
The dynamic of coordination that emerged during Spitzer's tenure is
particularly interesting. I have already noted the horizontal coordination
among state regulators that Spitzer encouraged. 30 What of Spitzer and the
SEC? In the standard account, their interaction has been conceived as

27
28
29
30

See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 15-16.
See Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 19, at 874.
See id. at 907-08.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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31
distinctly non-coordinative. It looks on the surface like a story of conflict.
Yet the indisputable dimension of conflict does not render their engagement
non-coordinative. Contrary to quite common misconceptions, even among
legal scholars, strategic dynamics of coordination need not lack in conflict. In
pure coordination games-commonly represented in narratives of where to
meet or to drive--conflict is absent. But the most interesting coordination
games, including those explored in Thomas Schelling's studies of the strategy
of conflict, are those that incorporate a certain degree of conflict alongside a
dominant incentive to coordinate. 32 In the "conflict" of the SEC and Spitzer,
thus, we actually have a competition to secure coordination outcomes more or
less favorable to one party or the other.

It should consequently come as little surprise that, for all the conflict that
has been highlighted, Spitzer's settlements were almost invariably joined by
the SEC.33 Although Spitzer was largely successful in securing settlements he
desired-itself a process of coordination34--these almost always required
meaningful compromise with the SEC. Cutting across their varied conflicts,
then, one finds a dominant goal of coordination.
A certain pattern of persuasion, finally, can also be seen in the engagement
of Spitzer and the SEC. But a more meaningful effort at persuasion may be
evident in Spitzer's engagement of regulators across state lines. In each of his
35
cases, Spitzer sought to proceed in conjunction with other state regulators.
Yet even independent initiatives in other states to regulate the financial
markets might be seen as outgrowths of these efforts at persuasion. Spitzer's
success in New York can thus be understood to have triggered prosecutions in
other states as well.
Most of all, one might see a kind of persuasion in the very breadth of
Spitzer's cases. As suggested above, there can be little doubt about the gap
between Spitzer's formal enforcement authority and the scope of the relevant
conduct. Most of that conduct, most of its victims, and most of the
beneficiaries of Spitzer's settlements were outside the state of New York. His
31 See Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 19, at 875; Stefania A. Di Trolio, Public Choice
Theory, Federalism, and the Supply Side to Blue-Sky Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1279, 1279-80 (2004);
Jones, supra note 22, at 118-19.
32 See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1038-39, 1051-53

(2006).
33 See Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 19, at 874.
34 See Ahdieh, supra note 32, at 1038-39.
35 See Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 19, at 873-74.
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local success served a persuasive function of sorts, however, allowing him to
leverage his formal, internally directed enforcement power to establish a
broader, externally directed authority. 36 At least in their breadth, then,
Spitzer's successes might be seen as less a function of power, than of
persuasion.
EARLY SIGNS OF INTERSYSTEMIC GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL

ACCOUNTING

Finally, the characteristics of intersystemic governance that I outline in the
introduction to this symposium can also be discerned in recent shifts in the
regulation of financial accounting standards. The latter have long been a
subject of transnational contention, with the United States insisting that
disclosures mandated by U.S. securities law utilize U.S. Generally Accepted

Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) rather than alternative international
standards.37 Scholarly debate over the issue has been substantial,3 8 as has been

the pressure on the SEC to ease access to U.S. capital markets, by accepting
foreign disclosures compliant with international standards. 39 Until recently,
however, there has been little suggestion of any potential change.

Whether motivated by a sense of the United States' faltering position in the
global competition for capital, 40 a sudden realization of the efficacy of
international standards, or otherwise, the SEC appears to be increasingly open
to the use of international accounting standards-now termed International

36 Here, we quite clearly see the flattening of power suggested in my introductory remarks. See Ahdieh,
supra note 1, at 25.
37 See Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of InternationalSecurities Regulation, 24
YALE J.INT'L L. 61, 92 (1999); Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities
Offerings: Analysis of JurisdictionalApproaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 243
(1999).
38 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of "'Principles-Based
Systems" in CorporateLaw, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411 (2007); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Racing Toward the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on
International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1785 n.111 (2002); James D. Cox,
Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200 (1999).
39 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel & Mary S. Head, Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry into U.S. Markets, 24
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1207, 1208-10 (1993).
40 See MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE U.S.'s
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007); COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM
REPORT OF THE COMMITEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (2006); COMM'N ON THE REGULATION OF
U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2007).
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Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The U.S. has long been willing to
participate in discussions of international disclosure standards. Since 1973, the
International Accounting Standards Committee, now succeeded by the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), has been developing and
refining proposed international accounting standards. 4 1 The United States has
participated in that dialogue, both directly and indirectly, for much of that
time.4 2
Yet it has resisted efforts to operationalize those standards-at least in
ways that might impact the singular orientation of U.S. law to U.S. GAAP.
Whatever their ultimate role, it seemed the U.S. had drawn a clear line against
the use of international accounting standards to gain access to U.S. securities
markets.43 Given as much, U.S. participation seemed to be intended to shift
the standards in our direction, rather than actually accepting them, or moving
U.S. standards in their direction.
The SEC would now seem to be shifting course.44 On August 7, 2007, it
issued a concept release proposing to permit U.S. issuers to prepare their
financial statements in accordance with the International Financial Reporting
Standards issued by the IASB. 45 This might help to reduce disparities in
disclosure practices, the release suggested, while still providing for adequate
disclosure of financial information. It would also serve to sustain transnational

41 See Cox, supra note 38, at 1207-08.
42 See Concept Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers to Prepare Financial Statements in Accordance with
International Financial Reporting Standards, SEC Release No. 33-8831, at 4, 23 (Aug. 7, 2007), available at
http://sec.gov/rules/concept/2007/33-8831.pdf; Douglas W. Arner, Globalisation of Financial Markets: An
InternationalPassportfor Securities Offerings?, 35 INT'L LAW. 1543, 1559-60 (2001); Roberta A. Karmel,
Will Convergence of Financial Disclosure Standards Change SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers?, 26 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 485, 523 (2000).
43 See supra note 37.

44 Predicates to the SEC's recent moves might be found in decisions of the U.S.-based Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). In October 2002, the FASB and IASB announced their entry into the
Norwalk Agreement, by which they committed to make their "best efforts" to achieve convergence in U.S. and
international accounting standards. See Financial Accounting Standards Board & Int'l Accounting Standards
Board, Memorandum of Understanding ("The Norwalk Agreement"), Sept. 18, 2002, available at
http://www.fasb.org/news/memorandum.pdf. They re-affirmed that agreement in February 2006. See "A
Roadmap for Convergence between IFRS and U.S. GAAP-2006-2008 Memorandum of Understanding
between the FASB and the IASB," Feb. 27, 2006, available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/874B63FB56DB-4B78-B7AF-49BBA18C98D9/0/MoU.pdf. As to the SEC's own baby steps in this direction, see
Release 33-8831, supra note 42, at 24-27.
45 SEC Release No. 33-8831, supra note 42.
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capital markets-and implicitly the U.S. markets' centrality to them-even
in
46
the face of increasing regulatory compliance costs in the United States.
Beyond such substantive integration, the SEC release sketches an
institutional frame for intersystemic governance. It describes a far closer
pattern of engagement between the IASB and the U.S. Financial Accounting
Standards Board-a "robust and active process" of dialogue and engagement

by which differences in standards will be minimized.47 Among the functional
features of such engagement, the SEC cites coordinated agendas, as well as

concurrent work on major projects.

Further, it envisions an ability of the

boards to episodically act in tandem in response to exigent needs. 48
In this final example, overlap and complexity begin with the ease of capital
49
flows in present-day financial markets, as highlighted in the introduction.

Funds can now move almost instantaneously to almost any market across the
globe. It is increasingly difficult to speak of U.S. markets in isolation from
other markets. Capital of U.S. investors is widely invested overseas,
while
5
funds in the U.S. markets can be traced to myriad foreign sources. 0
As I described in the introduction, regulatory overlap naturally follows, as

issuers seek capital across multiple markets.

Such issuances raise the

possibility of divergent disclosure demands from the multiple masters of those
respective markets. 51 Here, patterns of overlap are keyed to significantly

heightened transaction costs of capital formation. This becomes only more
true as the use of IFRS spreads.52

46 See id. While no further regulatory action has yet been taken on the Concept Release, it is worth
noting the SEC's November 15, 2007 decision to permit "foreign private issuers" to submit financial
statements prepared using international accounting standards. See SEC Takes Action to Improve Consistency
of Disclosure to U.S. Investors in Foreign Companies, SEC Release No. 2007-235 (Nov. 15, 2007); see also
SEC Release No. 33-8831, supra note 42, at 12 (noting connection of proposed change in standards for foreign
private issuers and broader initiative outlined in Concept Release). Notably, this represents the first time the
SEC has permitted general use of financial statements neither prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP, nor
reconciled to it. See The Convergence Blog, http://www.theconvergenceblog.com (Nov. 18, 2007).
47 See SEC Release 33-8831, supranote 42, at 16.
48 See id.
49 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 12; see also Robert W. Hillman, Cross-Border Investment, Conflict of
Laws, andthe Privatization of Securities Law, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 331, 351 (1992).
50 See Edward F. Greene & Linda C. Quinn, Building on the International Convergence of the Global
Markets:A Modelfor Securities Law Reform, 1372 PLI/CoRP 561, 563 (2003).
51 See SEC Release 33-8831, supra note 42, at 34.
52 See id. at 6.
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U.S. markets, meanwhile, are heavily dependent on the ready flow of
funds. Much has been made of the holding of U.S. public debt by overseas
entities-including strategic competitors such as China.53 With huge (and
daily increasing) ownership stakes of foreign entities in U.S. firms, U.S.
corporations are no less dependent on global capital markets. 54 The same is
true, of course, in the reverse direction. No economy, it is increasingly clear, is
an island unto itself.
The efficient flow of capital, with all that it entails for efficient pricing, the
optimal financing of investment opportunities, and the market for corporate
control, has thus come to involve a significant dimension of coordination. The
coordination game of standard-setting-in this case, in the harmonization of
disclosure standards-is central to global markets. 55 This is perhaps the
clearest lesson of the recent shift in U.S. policy on international accounting
standards. As elusive as consensus on common standards may be, overlapping
markets and resulting financial dependence demand that it occur; if recent
events are any indication, it is beginning to happen.
The recent Concept Release outlines the efforts of national securities
market regulators to coordinate their regulatory pursuits. Central to these
efforts is the work of the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO), "the largest international cooperative forum for securities regulatory
agencies. ' 56 Most recently, by way of example, IOSCO has sought to
encourage such coordination by creating a database for the compilation and
dissemination of national regulators' experiences with IFRS. 57 The ultimate
complexity of the task of coordination, however, is evident in the existence of
other regimes of coordination as well, including the SEC's active coordination
of its efforts with the Committee of European Securities Regulators.58

53 See CONG. RESEARCH SVC, IS CHINA ATHREAT TO THE U.S. ECONOMY? 2-3 (2007).

54 Significant recent investments in distressed U.S. banks and other firms by so-called "sovereign wealth
funds," for all the attention they have received, represent only one facet of this trend. See Floyd Norris, A
Worrisome New Wrinkle in Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at Cl.
55 In this case, we see both the public and private dimensions of coordination described in the
introduction. See Ahdieh, supra note 1,at 18-20.
56 See SEC Release 33-8831, supra note 42, at 23; see also Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note
19, at 878; David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J.INT'L

L. 547,561-69(2005).
57 See SEC Release 33-8831, supra note 42, at 34.
58 See id. The engagement of the SEC with the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)
also serves to highlight the layered patterns of coordination noted in my introductory remarks, given CESR's
own substantial coordination project, among national regulators in Europe. See Ahdieh, supra note 1,at 19.
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Finally, much of this coordination is happening through patterns of
engagement heavily inflected by advocacy and persuasion. In the
development of international accounting standards, a debate has been playing
itself out, as various public and private entities seek to advance their own
conceptions and models of disclosure. The SEC's Concept Release highlights
as much, in its juxtaposition of the need for national securities regulators to
avoid conflicts in IFRS interpretation and a strong emphasis on the fact that
"each securities regulator retains the responsibility, and accordingly the right,
to make its own final decisions." 59 Between these poles, of course, is the realm
of effective persuasion. 6° Ultimately, success in this debate is not a product of
any given participant's capacity for coercion. Rather, it relies on a meaningful
appreciation and understanding of competing standards and the persuasion of
other participants as to the optimality of one's own.
CONCLUSION

Much remains to be considered in assessing the operation of a regime of
intersystemic governance in U.S. securities law. Even as to the selected case
studies here, the actual parameters of implementation remain unresolved.
Normative concerns attendant to jurisdictional overlap and regulatory
dependence are likewise left implicit in the discussion above. Most broadly,
the foregoing leaves open the question of the episodic versus broader utility of
schemes of intersystemic governance.
Whatever promise intersystemic
governance might have in the selected spheres described above, does it mean
anything for securities regulation more generally?
All of that said, this brief essay may nonetheless serve certain valuable
ends: First, it may highlight the ways in which complexity and overlap,
coordination, dependence, and persuasion are an unavoidable reality, at least in
selected areas of modem law and regulation. Softening the blow, however, it
also reveals the potential utility of these patterns in the design and operation of
regulatory regimes. Especially given the orientation of most legal scholarship

59 See SEC Release 33-8831, supra note 42, at 35 (emphasis added).
60 An even more concrete example of the dynamic of persuasion at work is the SEC's analysis of how the
need for prompt interpretation of an IFRS provision might be reconciled with coordinated-and perhaps
centralized-interpretation of its terms. In essence, the Concept Release sees the national regulator as
expressing a view by way of interim measure, and then referring the question to the IASB or other
transnational standard-setting body, for final assessment. See id.at 35. It bears emphasizing that such a
discursive scheme would rely heavily, and in both directions, on effective persuasion.
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to law's traditional project of line-drawing, 6' this may be a critical aspect of
any effort to move forward.
Finally, the foregoing may suggest the value of greater "microanalysis" of
the institutions of the securities markets. 62 Through more targeted study of
particular institutions and institutional interactions, we may gain significant
traction on the actual dynamics at work in securities regulation. By more
closely studying institutional patterns in each of the areas described above, I
would posit, we may achieve substantially greater insight into the appropriate
design of relevant law and regulation. To reiterate, I do not suggest that I have
engaged in the requisite level of precision and detail herein. This essay may
nonetheless have done a service, if it helps to point us in the right direction.

61 See Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation , supra note 19, at 867-68.
62 See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996).

